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Reflections on representation in Australian
superannuation governance
Dr Ronald B Davis UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA FACULTY OF LAW
The size and importance of pension organisations
around the world have grown to the point where they are
crucial to the economic and social wellbeing of both
individual members and their countries. At the same
time, financial markets have grown more and more
complex. Australia’s mandatory contribution superan-
nuation system has expanded tremendously over its
relatively short lifespan. Scholars and commentators
have portrayed some of Canada’s largest defined-benefit
pension plans as models of good governance based on
their integration of accountability to stakeholders with
expertise in their management structure.1 One study of
81 pension funds from around the globe found that the
financial performance of the best-governed funds exceeded
those of the worst-governed by an average of 2.4% per
year over the four-year period ending in 2003.2 This
study reproduced earlier study results showing a positive
correlation between governance and financial perfor-
mance.3 This correlation and the important role of
retirement savings institutions make the governance of
superannuation funds a matter of public interest.
One of the tensions in pension fund governance
design is that between accountability and financial
market expertise. This is often expressed as concerns
that the inclusion of plan member nominated/appointed
trustee-directors in the governing body may lead to
underperformance, due to an inability to react appropri-
ately to financial market developments.4 On the other
hand, I have argued that the broad discretion exercised
by the governing body, coupled with the potential
conflicts of interest among stakeholders and between the
service providers and plan members, makes some form
of governing body representation or accountability to
plan members necessary.5 Joining the United Kingdom
and Australia, along with most other countries belonging
to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, the Canadian provinces of Quebec and
Manitoba have made member-nominated pension trust-
ees mandatory.6 The benefits of representation are that it
offers a cost-effective means of addressing conflicts of
interest in an industry whose primary function is prof-
itable investing of other people’s money. Where there
are such conflicts, the governance system in place must
ensure that they are resolved in favour of those whose
assets are invested in the scheme. In accumulation/
defined contribution schemes such as those predominat-
ing in Australia, the assets are unambiguously those of
the members. In addition, representation offers an alter-
native motivation to the financial incentives based on
short-term performance offered to senior executives of
the fund or service providers; provides an antidote to
democratic deficit in our important institutions; and
offers an avenue through which the interests of plan
members in better environmental, social and corporate
governance performance of investee businesses can be
pursued through the investment activities of superannua-
tion schemes.
With much of the world turning away from defined
benefit and towards defined contribution pension plans,
Australia has much to offer as a pioneer in the regulation
of the governance of large-scale defined contribution
plans. Canada’s federal parliament and the legislatures
of several provinces have embarked on a new form of
defined contribution plan, the Pooled Registered Pension
Plan, which will face similar governance challenges to
those facing Australia’s superannuation schemes. Many
important regulatory lessons can be learned from its
experience and the recent reforms implemented follow-
ing the Cooper Review. However, one reform proposed
in the Review seems to lack the usually rigorous
analysis and justification offered for many of its other
recommendations.
The Cooper Review’s recommendations on the gov-
ernance of superannuation fund boards of directors
included fundamental changes. In the non-profit “indus-
try” sector, it recommended the abandonment of man-
datory equal employer and member representation, and
the imposition of the requirement that one-third of the
directors be non-associated (“independent”). It also
recommended that a majority of directors in the for-
profit “retail” sector be independent, although this rec-
ommendation was not at the forefront of debate in the
run-up to the recent election. I have serious concerns
about both of these proposals.
Implementing the recommendations in the industry
sector will undermine member representation and account-
ability, a key factor enhancing the ability of trustee-
directors to address the conflicts of interest inherent in
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mature superannuation schemes. In addition, the justifi-
cations offered for the change offer a weak, abstract
explanation of its necessity; provide no elucidation of a
concrete, measurable goal by which to determine whether
the change has produced the desired result; and fail to
generate a persuasive narrative about why independence
offers value in the context of superannuation fund
governance. Member representation is important in an
accumulation superannuation system because it is the
members’ money that is being managed and they bear all
of the risks. The choice of the trustee form of gover-
nance emphasises the importance of protecting the
interests of members in its fundamental requirement that
trustee-directors must manage their money in the best
interests of members and never allow the interests of
trustee-directors to conflict with their duties.
Conflicts with members’ interests in Australia’s man-
datory accumulation scheme reside primarily in their
relations with the for-profit advisers and service provid-
ers to the scheme, every dollar of whose profit reduces
the members’ benefits by the same amount. The trustee-
directors’ responsibility is to ensure that the return on
these expenditures exceeds the cost to the members.
Reaching this goal is a much more difficult project in the
retail sector, where there are numerous associations
between the majority of directors and the service pro-
viders.7 In addition, the interests of members and
managers can diverge — for example, with respect to
the potential destruction of long-term value for short-
term gain if management compensation is determined by
short-term results; with respect to the appropriate scale
of management compensation; and with respect to
decisions to invest in order to shore up the financial
position of the industry sponsoring the fund.
The Cooper Review cited the following rationale for
equal representation by MP John Dawkins in 1992:
One of the most important ways in which members are able
to participate in the management and protection of their
retirement savings is through representation on the board of
trustees.
The Review then noted that:
• the replacement of single-employer defined ben-
efit by multi-employer accumulation schemes and
fund choice meant that an employer’s legitimate
interests and identification with funds was greatly
diminished;
• representative trustee-directors were predomi-
nantly appointed by employer organisations and
unions that did not represent everyone in the fund;
and
• the current system left pensioners and non-union
members unrepresented.8
However, instead of investigating means of enhanc-
ing member representation, the Review opted to recom-
mend that non-representative trustee-directors be appointed
based on the assertion that having independent directors
was the best practice in corporate governance. While
recent events at companies — such as Enron — with
these best practices in place may raise questions about
this assertion, the need for independent directors in
superannuation can be questioned on another ground.
The Review ignored an important difference between
corporations and industry superannuation. In corporate
governance, the problem is that shareholders face severe
collective action problems in monitoring and disciplin-
ing the directors and management through the ballot. In
the industry funds, these collective action problems are
reduced because representative union organisations have
the resources and coordination necessary to protect plan
members’ interests in superannuation. To the extent that
there is a concern that the union members’ superannua-
tion interests are significantly different from those of
members outside the union, some alternative organisa-
tion could have been considered before determining that
they, and other members, are better off with trustee-
directors who are completely divorced from them and
their representative organisations. Another crucial dif-
ference is that shareholders are able to elect and remove
the independent directors, offering a degree of account-
ability that will be missing in the superannuation indus-
try where the existing trustee-directors of trustee corporations
will likely be those appointing the independent trustee-
directors. I will discuss the problematic aspects of this
factor further below.
The Review offered no concrete, measurable goal
that its proposal for a fundamental governance shift
would achieve, opting instead for the assertion that an
“outside perspective” was vital for the industry funds by
providing an “objective assessment of issues”.9 No
illustrations of the failure of industry boards to objec-
tively assess issues were offered, leaving one to wonder
how this missing element had manifested itself in the
20 years prior to the Review. Indeed, the fact that
industry superannuation funds have consistently outper-
formed retail funds (which are not required to have
representatives on the governing body) over a long
period of time ought to have raised this question: What
is so fundamentally wrong with their governance struc-
ture that requires such a radical structural change in
response?10
In the retail sector, while knowledgeable persons
have recognised that the issue of directors’ associations
with the financial institution and service providers needs
to be addressed, the appointment of non-associated
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independent trustee-directors, without a means of enhanc-
ing accountability, seems doomed to repeat the gover-
nance failures of institutions such as the US mutual fund
industry.11 There, lucrative compensation for directors,
lack of available resources and information, and depen-
dence on the incumbent directors for reappointment
have combined to lead the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to lament a “serious breakdown in
management controls” and to determine that its 2001
amendments requiring a majority of independent direc-
tors on the funds’ boards “do not go far enough”. The
SEC justified its decision to increase the number of
independent directors to 75% and to require that an
independent chair be appointed on the grounds that the
fund adviser was in a position to dominate the board
through its monopoly of information and control of the
board’s agenda.12 In addition, concerns about relative
performance in the North American mutual fund indus-
try have been raised. Studies comparing Canadian and
US mutual fund and pension fund performance —
controlling for size, investment style and risk — find
that mutual funds significantly underperform benchmark
returns, while pension fund returns are very close to
those of a benchmark portfolio.13
To summarise my concerns, these non-associated
directors — adrift from all but the most formal legal ties
to the scheme members — will gravitate towards those
with the power of appointment, and be vulnerable to
capture by the full-time management of the scheme,
because of insufficient resources and lack of information
necessary to act as an effective constraint on their
actions. The lack of a robust system of accountability to
members in the Cooper Review recommendations will
compound these problems.
Member representation offers clear benefits in pro-
viding a cost-effective means of addressing both external
and internal conflicts with the best interests of the
members through the solidarity and accountability to the
representative organisation. In addition, it increases the
social legitimacy of an institution vitally important to
both the present and future wellbeing of Australians. The
case has not been made for such a substantial change,
neither in the Cooper Review nor in the evidence about
independent director effectiveness in similar settings. As
a tool of corporate governance, it is designed to address
a problem that is not present in industry funds. Recon-
sideration and further study seem more appropriate than
immediate implementation of these recommendations.
Dr Ronald B Davis
Associate Professor
University of British Columbia Faculty
of Law
davis@law.ubc.ca
This article is based on a presentation to a workshop
entitled “Independence and Accountability in Superan-
nuation”, held on 23 August 2013, that was jointly
supported by Herbert Smith Freehills, ASFA and the
Centre for Law Markets and Regulation.
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